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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a simple formal analytical model delivering qualitative predictions for response times in binary-choice experiments. It
combines a dual-process/multi-strategy approach with the standard diffusion model, modeling a utility decision process and a heuristic
decision process as diffusion processes of evidence accumulation. For experiments with objective alternatives (including many tasks in
judgment and decision making), the model predicts that errors will be quicker than correct responses in case of process conflict and slower
in case of alignment, capturing a well-documented asymmetry regarding slow or fast errors. Further, the model also predicts that correct
responses are slower in case of conflict than in case of alignment, capturing the well-known Stroop effect. The model is also extended to cover
experiments with subjective alternative evaluations, that is, preferential choice. In this case, results depend on whether trials are hard or easy,
that is, on whether the heuristic can be interpreted as relatively automatic or not. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Response times are a central tool for the study of psychological
processes underlying human decisions. They are especially
important in two-alternative choice experiments, which in turn
are ubiquitous in several branches of psychology. Many formal
analytical models have been developed to account for regu-
larities in the data, one of the most prominent thereof being
the diffusion model of evidence accumulation (Ratcliff, 1978,
2013; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Smith, 2000). This model has
harvested many successes, chief among them being able to
account for the speed–accuracy trade-off (Wickelgren, 1977).
However, the mathematical complexity of diffusion processes
is relatively high, and analytical results are scarce, leading many
researchers to rely on simulations for model evaluation.
This paper proposes a parsimonious formal-analytical
model for response times in binary choice decisions, the
dual-process diffusion model or DPDM. My objective is
not to develop a parametric fit for individual decision
makers, but rather to obtain analytically founded, easily
testable predictions on conditional, average response times.
The targets are experimental paradigms in which decisions
can be usefully characterized as those arising from either a
“conflict” or an “alignment” of decision criteria, strategies,
or processes. A simple example is the Stroop Task (Stroop,
1935), where incongruent trials correspond to a choice where
naming the word and naming the color produce different
responses, and congruent trials are those where both
responses are aligned. Another example from the consumer
choice literature is the decision to buy consumer items that
differ along two main attributes, for example, brand and
price. Analogously, in judgment and decision-making
experiments where a particular heuristic or decision bias is
targeted, the heuristic can either prescribe a response contrary
to the normative one (a conflict), or one coinciding with it
(alignment). Examples of the latter kind include the interaction
between intuitive and normative responses (e.g., the conflict in
the LINDA problem, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) and more
complex interactions between behavioral rules. For instance,
a reinforcement heuristic might prescribe to repeat whatever
has been successful in the past, which, depending on the
problem at hand, might or might not be normatively optimal
(Achtziger & Alós-Ferrer, 2014).
The simplest way to capture the idea of conflict and
alignment is to postulate two different decision processes relying
on different cues, analogously to the way dual-process models
(e.g., Alós-Ferrer & Strack, 2014; Evans, 2008; Sloman, 1996;
Strack & Deutsch, 2004) are built. An alternative interpretation
is to define conflict and alignment with respect to the pres-
criptions of multiple strategies in a multi-attribute decision-
making context, where each decision strategy relies on a
different set of attributes (e.g., Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, &
Betsch, 2014; Weber & Johnson, 2009).
The approach is also conceptually related to Rottenstreich
and Hsee (2001) and Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) (see also
Hsee, Rottenstreich, & Xiao, 2005). These authors argued that
decisions are often the result of two different kinds of valuations.
The first, valuation by calculation, essentially corresponds to the
economic concepts of preference, utility, or willingness to pay.
The second, valuation by feeling, captures more affective
predispositions for the alternatives. In the spirit of this dis-
tinction, and for the sake of concreteness, the model will be
formulated in terms of two decision processes, the utility process
and the heuristic process. The former is meant to capture the
more computational–normative aspects of decision making,
while the latter broadly corresponds to the evaluation of
intuitive–affective attributes. In both cases, the word “process”
is used for concreteness, but can be taken to mean either
“strategy” or “criterion.”
The model is built on the premise that the actual decision
arises from the interplay of the utility process and the heuristic
process. Each of the processes, however, is treated as a
mathematical diffusion process as in the Ratcliff (1978) model.
The model hence combines foundations from different strands
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of the literature and partakes from their respective strengths.
The structure, however, is simple enough to allow deriving
analytical predictions that translate directly into empirically
testable hypotheses.
The architecture of the DPDM places it within the category
of multi-strategy approaches to decision making (Marewski &
Link, 2014), in the sense that decisions are ultimately made by
one of two strategies, captured by the heuristic and utility
processes. However, the modeling of each of the two processes
relies on evidence-accumulation models (Ratcliff, 1978),
which are commonly viewed as an example of single-strategy
approaches, in the sense that they postulate a domain-general
mechanism. In this sense, the DPDM is a parsimonious
multi-strategy approach. Alternatively, the DPDM can be seen
as a minimalistic extension of a prominent single-strategy
framework to accommodate the interplay of processes that
defines dual-process theories.
The objective of this work is not to build a detailed, flexible
model capable of fitting experimental data from every
conceivable paradigm. Rather, the aim is to derive general,
testable predictions independent of parameter fitting and of
the specific processes selected. This point is important, because
a generalized criticism of multi-strategy approaches is that, by
tailoring the strategies to the experimental task, the general
approach might become excessively flexible and hard to refute
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2011; Marewski & Link, 2014). On the
other hand, a typical criticism of the single-strategy approach
is that such models come with a large number of free para-
meters that can be adjusted by the researcher to mimic
different, conceivable strategies (Marewski & Link, 2014). In
contrast, the objective of this paper is to derive qualitative
predictions that hold independently of the exact values of the
parameters which are part of the model. This way, the DPDM
remains falsifiable from the onset.
The basic version of the model targets decisions from
inference. Those correspond to experiments with fixed alter-
natives that can be objectively evaluated and where there is a
clear notion of what an error is. Examples include tasks in the
domain of probability judgment, where individuals should rely
on objectifiable attributes, and many tasks in cognitive psy-
chology. The model is used to obtain two different kinds of
predictions. The first concerns the relative speeds of errors and
correct responses, where an asymmetric prediction is obtained.
In case of conflict, correct responses will be slower than errors.
However, in case of alignment, errors will be slower than
correct responses. Both predictions are already supported by
empirical evidence from the literature. The second kind of
predictions concerns the relative speeds of correct responses
in case of alignment and in case of conflict. The prediction of
the model in this case captures the well-known Stroop effect:
correct responses are slower in case of conflict (incongruent
tendencies) than in case of alignment (congruent tendencies).
The second, more elaborated version of the model targets
preferential choice. This corresponds to experiments with
variable alternatives, where individuals’ choices rely on sub-
jective attributes. Examples include tasks from the literature on
attitudes and attitude change, and many examples in economic
decision making, as consumer choice in the presence of multiple
salient attributes or the extensive literature on lottery choice. In
these experiments, each participant typically faces a large
collection of binary choices, which might uncover an underlying
heuristic conflicting with a more normative (but still subjective)
evaluation. Trials can then be classified in those where the
heuristic poses a serious challenge by virtue of delivering an
intuitive response (hard trials) and those where it does not (easy
trials). For hard trials, the predictions from the basic model can
be extended to this setting in a mathematically straightforward
way. For easy trials, however, errors will take longer both in case
of alignment and in case of conflict.
Each version of the model is presented in a different section
later on, with separate sections addressing the predictions for
the speed of errors and the Stroop effect. A further section
before the discussion presents an example applying the
(second) model to a consumer choice paradigm. The discussion
briefly addresses the relation to other models in the literature,
possible generalizations, and avenues for future research.
FIXED ALTERNATIVES: A MODEL OF INFERENCE
Many experiments in decision making involve two abstract
choices, with participants’ payment (if at all) depending on their
estimation of which of them is correct. In many probability
inference tasks, participants are asked to choose the correct
answer to a given question. Examples include the classical
questions used to demonstrate the representativeness heuristic
or, more generally, base-rate neglect (De Neys & Glumicic,
2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1972, 1973), including the celebrated lawyers–
engineers problem. Further examples include the LINDA
problem used to study the conjunction fallacy (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983), or even the questions part of the Cognitive
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). Experiments in the field of
probability biases and belief updating often employ designs
where risk or uncertainty is represented by urns from which
balls are extracted, but the prior information is varied from
decision to decision. Examples include designs capturing
both the conservativeness and representativeness heuristic
(Achtziger, Alós-Ferrer, Hügelschäfer, & Steinhauser, 2014;
Grether, 1980, 1992), and experiments studying biases derived
from reinforcement (Achtziger & Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Charness
& Levin, 2005), among many others. Beyond judgment and
decision making, the description also fits many paradigms in
the fields of attention and cognition, starting with the flanker
task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and the Stroop task (MacCleod,
1991; Stroop, 1935), if we consider the named color and the
actual color as the two options. In all these experiments, the
choices themselves are fixed and neutral (objective), in the
sense that the framing remains constant, and the participants’
task does not involve a subjective evaluation of the choices
themselves. Often, the target of the experiment is a specific bias
or heuristic, to be studied against the benchmark of normatively
rational behavior.
This section presents the simplest version of the DPDM,
which is tailored to situations as described above. There are
two fixed alternatives, A and B, and two decision processes,
called the utility process (U) and the heuristic process (H) for
concreteness. These processes are modeled through mathematical
204 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Behav. Dec. Making, 31, 203–218 (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/bdm
diffusion processes, following sequential sampling models from
cognitive psychology (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). That is, each
of them is captured by a Brownian motion with drift X(t),
dX tð Þ ¼ μdt þ σdW tð Þ;
where μ and σ>0 are the drift and diffusion parameters,
respectively, and dW(t) is the increment of a standard
Brownian motion. The process is endowed with two barriers
ℓ, h with ℓ< 0< h. The interval ]ℓ, h[ is called the corridor
of the diffusion process. The decision process starts at
X(0) = 0 and selects A or B if the upper or lower barrier is
hit first, respectively. The idea is that evidence gradually
accumulates in favor of one or the other option, with the
drift describing both the rough direction and the swiftness
of the process, and the diffusion parameter describing an
inherent randomness.
The key of the model is the concept of favored response.
In the study of heuristics and biases, and also in the study of
perception and cognition, it is usually easy to associate a
typical response with each conceptualized decision process.
For example, for the Stroop task, let the utility process
capture the full-attention ideal. The favored response of this
process is the actual color. The heuristic process, however, has
the named color as the favored response, creating a conflict in
incongruent trials. In tasks capturing the representativeness
heuristic, the heuristic process favors the stereotypical response,
while the utility process favors the normatively correct option
derived from Bayes’ rule.
Within the context of a diffusion process, say that A (resp.
B) is the favored response of the process if μ> 0 (resp.
μ< 0). That is, the favored response is that reflecting the
default trend of the process, although because of the stochastic
nature of evidence accumulation, the actual response can differ
from the favored one. By renaming alternatives (or simply
exchanging their position), however, we can always focus on
the case μ>0. From now on, formally all diffusion processes
in the model are endowed with a positive trend. This does
not mean, however, that they all favor the same response. For
instance, if process H favors option A but process U favors
option B, we will have parameters μH>0 and μU> 0, but
process H is understood to have an upper barrier leading to A
and process U an upper barrier leading to B.
To provide increasingly better fits to the data, models
building on diffusion processes as shown earlier have studied
asymmetric barriers (Ratcliff, 1978) and enriched the basic
model by, for example, allowing for random starting points
(Ratcliff, 1978, 1981; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). The model
presented here, however, explains empirical regularities
without the recourse to such extensions. Hence, I will
concentrate on the unbiased case ℓ = h and normalize h=1.
The basic assumption in the literature of dual processes is
that there are two types of processes, automatic and
controlled. Automatic processes are quicker and reflect quick
associations, while controlled processes are slower and
partially reflect deliberation or cognition. In the terms of
the model, we can simply think that automatic processes
are those which, by virtue of relying on clear associations,
have a stronger tendency to select the favored response, or,
in the terms above, a larger drift. The assumption of the
model is that the heuristic process H is endowed with a drift
μH and the utility process with a drift μU, with μH>μU> 0 (and
both have the same diffusion parameter σ). As will be seen below
(Corollary 1), this assumption immediately implies that the
heuristic (automatic) process is faster than the utility (controlled)
process and also behaves more in a stimulus-response way,
selecting its own favored response more often than the utility
process. In other words, the heuristic process is “swifter.”
The simplification that positive drift is always toward the
favored response allows using μH,μU directly as the measure
of swiftness of the process. However, the processes can still share
the same favored response or deliver opposed prescriptions. An
alignment situation occurs if the response favored by the heuristic
process is the same as the one favored by the utility process, and
a conflict situation occurs if the favored responses are different.
For example, in the Stroop task, incongruent trials where the
named color is printed in a different color are conflict situations,
and congruent trials where the actual color matches the named
one are alignment situations. The situation posed by many
inference questions used to study decision biases is one of
conflict, as, for example, in the case of the LINDA problem.
The response favored by the utility process is, by definition,
normatively correct. Accordingly, decisions where this option
is selected will be referred to as correct decisions, and
decisions where the other response is selected will be called
errors. In general, however, the names “correct decision” and
“error” should be taken merely as a convenient terminology,
because the analysis also applies for situations where the
response of the heuristic process is, for whatever the reason,
considered to be desirable.
To complete the model, we need to detail the interaction of
both processes. I will adopt a simple, probabilistic approach.
Assume that, with probability 0<Δ< 1, the decision follows
the heuristic process, and with probability 1Δ, it follows
the utility process. It is natural to assume that Δ might be
influenced by factors as mood, cognitive load, monetary
incentives, and so on. However, the properties proven below
are independent of the exact value of Δ, and hence, this
parameter will not be fleshed out any further here.
A standard prediction of dual-process models is that total
response time in case of conflict is increased due to the
existence of the conflict itself. This is in agreement with
widespread evidence from cognitive psychology and
neuroscience indicating that the detection of a decision
conflict (by the central executive) is time-consuming.1 This
additional factor plays no role if one compares only response
times conditional on conflict or alignment, as in Theorem 1
below. However, this possibility needs to be explicitly taken
into account if one compares response times in case of
conflict and those in case of alignment, as in Theorem 2
below. It is natural to capture this element by specifying an
additional conflict detection time Di, which is weakly larger
1For example, a brain imaging study by De Neys et al. (2008) found ACC
activation in case of conflict in the lawyer–engineer problem of Kahneman
and Tversky (1972), independently of whether the heuristic response was
adopted or not, indicating that (time-consuming) conflict detection is
independent of the process and response ultimately selected.
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for conflict situations (i=1) than for alignment situations
(i=0), that is,D1≥D0. The particular caseD1=D0 is equivalent
to neglecting implications from conflict detection time.
INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIC MODEL
Figure 1 illustrates the basic workings of the DPDM. A
mechanistic, direct interpretation is as follows. For any given
decision problem, the heuristic process and the utility process
run in parallel, each of them following a diffusion process with
its own drift parameter. Simultaneously, a central executive
process selects one of the two processes: the heuristic process
with probability Δ and the utility process with the remaining
probability. The decision of the selected process is imple-
mented as soon as that process delivers a response. In case of
alignment, both processes favor the same, correct response,
that is, both upper boundaries correspond to a correct decision.
In case of conflict, the upper boundary of the heuristic process
corresponds to an error, while the upper boundary of the utility
process corresponds to a correct response.
This interpretation is close to the recent model of Pleskac
and Wershbale (2014) for the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(see the Discussion section for details). Of course, this
mechanistic reading of the model has to be seen as a
simplification. For instance, the response time is the response
time of the selected process, without direct or indirect
interference of the other process. This means that process
selection time is assumed either to occur before the actual
process time of to be short enough not to interfere with it. A
more nuanced version of the model could have process selection
depending on initial, early signals extracted from the two
processes. However, it is easy to see that a “race model” where
the first process to finish is selected would have low empirical
validity, because this would imply that a majority of our
decisions follow heuristic processes (which, fortunately, seems
not to be the case for most human decision makers).
The model can also be reframed in terms of multi-attribute
decision making as follows. Suppose there are two options
that differ along two attributes, for example, price and
branding. The attributes have an attached evaluation scale,
for example, some prices are lower than others and some
brands are more well-known than others. Hence, the
attributes can either point toward the same option
(alignment) or toward different options (conflict). Assume
one of the attributes captures the relevant evaluation (e.g.,
select the cheapest option), while the other is a heuristic/
automatic evaluation. The relevant evaluation always points
toward the correct response (although, being a stochastic
process, it might still generate an error). In case of conflict,
the heuristic evaluation points toward an error, but, in case
of alignment, it points toward the correct response. This
interpretation brings the model closer to the multi-attribute
model of Diederich (1997) (see the Discussion section).
DUAL-PROCESS PROPERTIES
Given a single decision process as those described above
(i.e., either the heuristic or the utility process), two quantities
are of interest. The first is the probability that the favored
response is selected, P. The complementary probability 1-P
will be called the fault probability, that is, the probability that
the process selects the non-favored response. The second
quantity of interest is the expected time until the process leaves
the corridor, T, that is, the (process) expected response time.
Explicit formulae for P and T are known (and become
relatively simple in the symmetric case) and have been
derived in the literature (e.g., Grasman, Wagenmakers, &
van der Maas, 2009; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005)2 using
standard techniques from stochastic calculus (Karatzas &
Shreve, 1998). The probability that the process selects its
favored option is given by









and the expected response time is given by
T μð Þ ¼
1
μ
2P  1ð Þ: (2)
with T(0) = limμ→ 0T(μ) = 1/(σ
2). A surprising but very
convenient property of the diffusion model in the symmetric
case is that the process response time conditional on either
response is identical (and hence equal to T; Palmer et al.,
2005, Appendix). This fact will greatly simplify the
computations in the sequel because one does not need to
consider conditional response times for a given process.
Fix the diffusion parameter σ and consider a family of
processes indexed by μ. Given a process as described, the
following comparative statics result is straightforward (and
well known).
Lemma 1 For a diffusion process with corridor ] 1, 1[,
both the fault probability and the response time are strictly
decreasing in μ.
Proof The expression of P(μ) above (1) shows that this
quantity is strictly increasing in μ; hence, 1P(μ) is strictly
decreasing in μ. It will be shown that the derivative of T(μ)
2Interestingly, these processes have also been considered in finance for the
analysis of double-barrier options, and the same formulae have been
independently derived there (e.g., Douady, 1998).Figure 1. Schematic representation of the model.
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is strictly negative, proving that T(μ) is strictly decreasing.
A direct computation shows that










T ′ μð Þ ¼
1
μ2
2P′ μð Þμ 2P μð Þ  1ð Þ
 
Hence, T ′(μ)< 0 ⇐⇒ 1+2P′(μ)μ<2P(μ). Writing z ¼ 2μ
σ2
,
a computation shows that this condition holds if and only if
1þ ezð Þ2 þ 2zez < 2 1þ ezð Þ
which simplifies to 2z< ez e z. This last inequality holds for
any z>0, as can be easily established taking a Taylor
expansion of the function f(z)= ez e z around 0. Hence,
T ′(μ)< 0, and it follows that T is strictly decreasing in μ. ■
The intuition of this result is simple. A process with a
larger drift parameter tends toward the favored response in
a swifter way, resulting in increased speed and also on a
lower probability of going astray. This fact is the key for
the interpretation of the model in dual-process terms.
Applying Lemma 1, we immediately obtain the following
result.
Corollary 1 Let a heuristic and a utility process with
μH>μU>0, common σ, and corridor ]1, 1[. Then,
(a) TH<TU, that is, the expected response time of the
heuristic process is shorter than that of the utility
process, and
(b) (1PH)< (1PU), that is, the fault probability of the
heuristic process is lower than that of the utility process.
The properties identified in the last corollary are both
intuitive and natural within a dual-process approach. They
justify the interpretation of the heuristic process as more
automatic and the utility process as more controlled. The
heuristic process is relatively fast and has a relatively low fault
probability, and can hence be interpreted as being closer to a
stimulus–response mapping. In contrast, the controlled process
is slower and has a larger fault probability, corresponding to
the idea of a deliberative process.
It should be remarked at this point that part (b) in the last
corollary does not mean that the probability of an error is
smaller for the heuristic process. This is not true, because
whether the favored response of the heuristic process is correct
or an error depends on whether the situation is one of conflict or
of alignment. In case of conflict, the heuristic process has a
larger probability of resulting in an error, because the process’
favored response is an error. In case of alignment, however,
the heuristic process is a quick and efficient process which
delivers the correct responsemore often than the utility process.
Remark 1 The DPDM aims to build a framework that is
as simple as possible. Hence, a number of structural
assumptions are made. For instance, the model abstracts from
many elements which add flexibility to evidence-accumulation
models. Specifically, it assumes no starting-point variability
and no starting bias. Also, it assumes symmetric barriers,
ℓ = h (the normalization h=1 is of course inconsequential
and just for convenience). More importantly, it assumes that
both processes have the same barrier. The model can be
enriched to accommodate such possibilities, but it is my
position that the predictions of the basic, simpler model should
be understood first. Hence, this task is left for future research.
However, it should be pointed out that the qualitative
predictions of the model are not very sensitive to small
variations in the approach. While the formulation of the
DPDM in terms of two diffusion processes with different
drift rates is natural, the predictions derived later for response
times depend only on the two properties identified in
Corollary 1. That is, the predictions discussed here still
obtain if one replaces the modeling of the heuristic and utility
process by a different formulation such that those two
properties still hold. For instance, consider the more general
case with symmetric but different barriers for the two
processes, that is, let the heuristic and the utility processes
have corridors ] hH, hH[ and ] hU, hU[, respectively. An
examination of the analytical formulae for fault probabilities
and expected response times in this case shows that the
predictions hold if the heuristic process has a weakly larger
drift rate and a weakly lower barrier than the utility process
(μH≥μU and hH≤ hU), as long as μH hH>μU  hU. The
predictions would not hold if, for example, μH=μU and
hH< hU, because in this later case the heuristic process
would have a larger fault probability than the utility process.
FAST AND SLOW ERRORS
There are many experimental paradigms where decisions can
be classified into correct responses and errors, and where
response times have been analyzed as a tool to better
understand the underlying decision processes. The empirical
relation between the response times of errors and correct
responses varies, often within the same class of paradigms.
For instance, a classical pattern found in choice detection
paradigms is that errors are typically slower than correct
responses if discrimination is hard or accuracy is emphasized,
but it is not uncommon to find that errors are faster than correct
responses if discrimination is easy or speed is emphasized (for
a discussion, see Townsend & Ashby, 1983, Chapter 9).
Correctly predicting experimentally observed patterns has
proven a difficult task (see, e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998, for
a discussion). In particular, the empirical observation of slow
errors for certain tasks was originally considered puzzling.
Fitting the diffusion model to this observation was one of
the motivations for introducing, for example, drift variability
(Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). However, the model discussed
here delivers this prediction in a natural way while sticking
to the simplest (unbiased) case.
The DPDM does of course not aim to organize the whole
literature on response times. The intention is more modest.
The predictions derived below aim at a particular subset of
paradigms, namely those where two different decision
processes or decision criteria can be identified and where
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error rates are high enough to allow for experimental testing.
Under these conditions, as we will see below, the DPDM
delivers a clear-cut prediction: fast errors arise in case of
conflict and slow errors in case of alignment.
Clear experimental evidence confirming the earlier
predictions has been obtained in the domain of judgment
and decision making. For instance, De Neys (2006) examined
response times in a conjunction fallacy problem and found
that errors were faster than correct responses. Because the
conjunction fallacy corresponds to a conflict situation, this
agrees with the prediction above. Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer
(2014) conducted a decision-making experiment that
endogenously created situations of conflict and of alignment.
Participants had to choose one of two covered urns, in which
balls of two colors were present; one and only one of the
colors resulted in monetary payment. The decision of interest
was made after a previous urn choice and ball extraction (with
replacement). Hence, a heuristic reinforcement process was
activated, of the form “choose the same urn again if I won,
switch if not”. Crucially, however, the number of balls of each
color in each urn depended on an unknown state of the world,
in such a way that the previous ball extraction allowed the
participant to determine (through Bayesian updating of beliefs)
which state was more likely and which urn choice was optimal.
In some of the trials, the optimal decision was the same as
prescribed by reinforcement (alignment); in other trials, it was
the opposite (conflict). The results of the experiment indicated
that errors were faster than correct responses in case of conflict
and slower than correct responses in case of alignment.
Tasks from the field of attention and cognition, as, for
example, the Stroop task, often fulfill the first criterion
mentioned earlier (with congruent trials generating alignment
and incongruent trials corresponding to conflict), but
empirically observed error rates are typically too low to
detect significant differences, especially in the case of
congruent trials. For the flanker task, White, Ratcliff, and
Starns (2011; Figure 1, Tables 1, 4, and 7) reported mean
response times of errors and correct responses in several
flanker tasks and observed an asymmetry that agrees with
the DPDM predictions: for incongruent trials, errors are
always faster than correct responses, but for congruent trials,
the opposite pattern is often observed.
We now prove the first main result, which, as announced,
establishes the predictions of the model regarding expected
response times conditional on conflict or alignment. That
is, the predictions refer to the actually observable response
times of the dual-process model, as opposed to those of an
individual process, which are unobservable.3
Theorem 1 Consider the DPDM for fixed alternatives, with
parameters Δ, μU, and μH with μH>μU>0.
(a) In case of alignment, the expected response time of
correct responses is smaller than the expected response
time of errors.
(b) In case of conflict, the expected response time of correct
responses is larger than the expected response time of
errors.
Proof Let QH be the probability that the heuristic process
selects the correct response. That is, in case of alignment,
we have QH=PH, but in case of conflict, QH=1PH, that
is, the probability that this process selects the correct
response is actually the fault probability, because the
erroneous response is favored. To simplify notation, let
PΔ=ΔQH+ (1Δ)PU. The expected response time
conditional on the response being right or wrong is given by
T Correctð Þ ¼
1
PΔ
ΔQHTH þ 1 Δð ÞPUTUð Þ
T Errorð Þ ¼
1
1 PΔ
Δ 1 QHð ÞTH þ 1 Δð Þ 1 PUð ÞTUð Þ
Then we compute
T Errorð Þ > T Correctð Þ ⇐⇒
THΔ 1 QHð ÞPΔ  QH 1 PΔð Þð Þ >
TU 1 Δð Þ PU 1 PΔð Þ  1 PUð ÞPΔð Þ ⇐⇒
THΔ PΔ  QHð Þ > TU 1 Δð Þ PU  PΔð Þ ⇐⇒
THΔ 1 Δð Þ PU  QHð Þ > TU 1 Δð ÞΔ PU  QHð Þ ⇐⇒
TH PU  QHð Þ > TU PU  QHð Þ
That is, we have that T(Error)>T(Correct) holds if and
only if TH(PUQH)>TU(PUQH).
In case of alignment,QH=PH>PU by the last corollary and
hence PUQH< 0. We conclude that T(Error)>T(Correct)
if and only if TH<TU. The latter holds by the last corollary.
This proves part (a).
In case of conflict, QH=1PH< 1PU by the last
corollary. Since PU > 12, hence 1PU<PU, it follows that
QH<PU and hence PUQH> 0. We conclude that T(Error)
<T(Correct) if and only if TH<TU (and vice versa).
The latter holds again by the last corollary, thus T(Error)
<T(Correct), proving part (b). ■
The intuition of this result is as follows. For the conflict
case, the utility process favors the correct response, while
the heuristic process favors the incorrect one. Hence, most
correct answers originate in the utility process, and those are
slower because TU>TH. The conclusion in case of alignment
might seem counterintuitive at first glance. However, recall
that in this case most responses generated by the heuristic
process are actually correct. Because PH>PU, in this case,
the heuristic process is a quick, efficient shortcut that selects
the incorrect answer with a smaller probability than the utility
process. It follows that most errors are generated by the
(slower) utility process. Hence, response times conditional
on errors tend to be longer in case of alignment.
The model of Ratcliff (1978) can also account for
differences in the relative speeds of correct responses and
errors by allowing the parameter μ to vary across trials (see
Ratcliff, 2013 for a recent discussion). In the original model,
the drift parameter μ itself is normally distributed. However,
as Ratcliff and Rouder (1998, Figure A) observed in a
numerical example, if μ takes only two positive values, the
3A version of Theorem 1 (which, however, was not formulated in terms of
diffusion processes) was also briefly discussed in Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer
(2014).
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expected time of the favored answer can be shorter than that
of the alternative one, fitting the prediction. A single process
with two possible positive drifts selected randomly is
mathematically equivalent to two randomly selected processes
with fixed but different drifts, and hence this conclusion also
follows from Theorem 3. This enables a reinterpretation of
the model as a (single-process) variant of the standard diffusion
model. The problem with this interpretation is that, in order to
simultaneously fit both earlier predictions, that is, the
interaction of response times for correct and incorrect
responses with conflict or alignment, the model would need
to specify inter-trial parameter variation in such a way that
alignment and conflict correspond to randomization among
drift terms of the same or different sign, respectively. Hence,
it is more natural to interpret the two possible values of the drift
parameter as two processes of different nature.
THE STROOP EFFECT
One of the most well-known empirical observations
concerning experimental observation of response times is
the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935), where (correctly) naming
the color of a word occurs more slowly when the word names
a different color (incongruent trials) than when it names the
same color (congruent trials). This effect is empirically robust
and easily reproduced (see, e.g., MacCleod, 1991, for a
review). In terms of the DPDM, the Stroop effect translates
into the assertion that the total expected time of correct
responses in case of conflict should be strictly longer than
the total expected time of correct responses in case of
alignment. This prediction arises naturally and is proven now.
Theorem 2 Consider the DPDM for fixed alternatives, with
parameters Δ, μU, μH with μH>μU> 0, D0, and D1 with
D1≥D0.
The expected response time of correct responses in case
of alignment is smaller than the expected response time of
correct responses in case of conflict.
Proof The expected response times (excluding conflict
detection times Di) are
TðCorrect Alignmentj Þ ¼
ΔPHTH þ 1 Δð ÞPUTU
ΔPH þ 1 Δð ÞPU
TðCorrect Conflictj Þ ¼
Δ 1 PHð ÞTH þ 1 Δð ÞPUTU
Δ 1 PHð Þ þ 1 Δð ÞPU
Note that both expressions are convex combinations of TH
and TU with different weights. Because TH<TU by Corollary
1, the statement follows if the weight of TH in case of alignment
is larger than the weight of TH in case of conflict, that is,
ΔPH
ΔPH þ 1 Δð ÞPU
>
Δ 1 PHð Þ
Δ 1 PHð Þ þ 1 Δð ÞPU
:
This later statement holds immediately because the real-
valued function f xð Þ ¼ x
xþ 1Δð ÞPUð Þ
is strictly increasing in x
and PH> (1PH) because PH> 1/2.
In case of conflict, the total expected response time is
incremented by D1. In case of alignment, it is incremented
by D0≤D1. Hence, the claim follows. ■
The intuition of the result is as follows. Both in case of
conflict and in case of alignment, in expected terms, the same
number of decisions will be made by the utility process, and
the same fraction of those will result in correct responses. If
one thinks in terms of an experiment, the expected number of
decisions coming from the utility process contributing to the
sample of response times (correct responses) is identical in
both cases. The same is not true for the heuristic process. The
same expected number of decisions will be made by the
heuristic process in both cases, but in case of alignment, most
of them (the favored responses) will be correct and hence
contribute to the sample of response times, while in case of
conflict, only the less numerous non-favored responses will
contribute to the sample. That is, in the sample (correct
responses), the frequency of response times that originate from
the quicker heuristic process is larger in case of alignment.
It is noteworthy that this result holds even if we do not
assume any differences in conflict detection and resolution
between conflict and alignment, that is, if D1=D0. That is,
the effect result does not hinge on the particular assumption
D1≥D0. It might also be reasonable to assume that in case
of alignment, more decisions are made by the heuristic
process, that is, to disentangle Δ in Δ1 (for the case of
conflict) and Δ0 (for alignment) with Δ0≥Δ1. It is easy to
see that the last result also holds under this more general
assumption, because essentially this again increases the
contribution of the heuristic process to the sample of
response times in case of alignment.
VARIABLE ALTERNATIVES: A MODEL OF
PREFERENTIAL CHOICE
This section extends the model to settings involving
subjective choices. A large part of the literature in judgment
and decision making, overlapping heavily with micro-
economics, is concerned with utilitarian choices, that is,
choices where there is no objectively correct or wrong
response, but rather the choice itself is the object of study.
A first example is the consumer choice literature, which
frequently examines the influence of different strategies and
the relevance of difference item attributes on choices. A
particular case is the influence of branding on preference-
based choices (Philiastides & Ratcliff, 2013; Thoma &
Williams, 2013). A second example is the extensive literature
on decisions under risk. The experimental workhorse in this
literature, ranging back to early examples as Lichtenstein
and Slovic (1971), is the choice among different bets or
lotteries, where optimal choices depend, for example, on
the participant’s attitude toward risk. In a typical experiment,
each participant makes a series of binary choices, where
every choice involves two different lotteries. Hence, the
options are not fixed, but change from trial to trial, and the
actual task is to evaluate the alternatives and choose
whichever is subjectively best. A third example is the
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literature on attitudes and post-decisional attitude change
(e.g., Ariely & Norton, 2008; Brehm, 1956), which has
motivated influential theories as cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957) and self-perception theory (Bem, 1967).
In experiments as those following Brehm (1956) or recent
variants as Alós-Ferrer, Granić, Shi, and Wagner (2012),
participants are presented with a series of alternatives, say,
artistic paintings or hypothetical holiday destinations, and
are asked to provide both evaluations (ratings or rankings)
and actual binary choices.
The model in the previous sections is now extended to
settings of this kind. For every given trial, the decision maker
faces a binary decision with two possible alternatives, A and
B. During the decision, two processes are active, a utility
process U and a heuristic process H. As in the previous
sections, each process follows a diffusion process with
symmetric barriers normalized to 1 and 1. However, unlike
in the previous section, the drift rates are not given, but rather
depend on the subjective evaluations of the alternatives.
The utility process operates on the basis of true
underlying utilities uA and uB for A and B, respectively. This
process always favors the “preferred” alternative, that is, it
favors A if uA>uB and favors B if uB>uA. The drift
parameter μU is a function of u= |uAuB|. Specifically,
μU :ℝ+→ℝ+ is a continuous and strictly increasing function
with μU(0) = 0. Given u, the probability PU(u) that the
favored response is chosen and the expected response time
TU(u) are obtained by replacing μ by μU(u) in Equations 1
and 2. The identity of the favored option depends on the sign
of uA uB, but PU(u) and TU(u) depend only on its
magnitude.
Because in a model of preferential choice there will
typically not be a normative criterion to determine one
response as “correct,” we will adopt here the terminology
“preferred” and “non-preferred alternative.” That is, the
preferred alternative is simply that which is preferred by
the utility process, in the sense of having a larger utility.
For a comparison of results with the fixed-alternatives
DPDM, the reader might equate “preferred” in this part of
the article with “correct” in the previous one. The heuristic
process favors the option that is superior according to some
other criterion (e.g., valuation by feeling), captured by real
numbers vA and vB, the heuristic utilities. This might be
either the preferred alternative or the non-preferred one.
An example might be, for example, the maximum amount
to win in a lottery, ignoring probabilities. Another example
might be the familiarity (recognition) of the brand of a
consumer item. Analogously to the utility process, the drift
parameter μH of the heuristic process is a continuous and
strictly increasing function of v= |vAvB|, specifically
μH :ℝ+→ℝ+, with μH(0) =0. Given v, the probability PH(v)
that the preferred option is chosen and expected response time
TH(v) are obtained replacing μ by μH(v) in Equations 1 and 2.
The assumption that drift rates are increasing in utility
differences is a natural, empirically motivated one. It is a
long-standing, well-established fact (both in psychology
and in economics) that decisions that are closer to
indifference take longer (e.g., Dashiell, 1937; Mosteller &
Nogee, 1951). This fact has also been observed in the risky
choice studies of Wilcox (1993) and Moffatt (2005). As
captured by Lemma 1, drift rates closer to zero are associated
with longer response times. That is, a larger utility difference
leads to a clear, easier decision resulting in a swifter path for
the decision process.
Since the alternatives and their evaluations change from
trial to trial within an experiment, we need to specify how
the true and the heuristic utilities arise. Since experiments
generally aim to randomize the presentation of options, we
assume that utilities uA and uB are drawn from continuous
random variables. Similarly, vA and vB are assumed to be
drawn from continuous random variables. Since the whole
analysis depends only on utility differences, all that is needed
is that the differences u= uAuB and v= vAvB are
independently distributed according to some (possibly
different) density functions, g and h. As in the previous
section, the model is completed with a parameter Δ capturing
the probability that the heuristic process is selected and
determines the actual response. Note that the case of
experiments with fixed options from the previous section
arises as a special (limit) case in which utilities are constant
across trials.
Consider a given trial where the choice between two
alternatives A and B is offered. Define an easy trial to occur
if μU(|uAuB|)>μH(|vAvB|). In this case, the utility
process, which favors the preferred response, is actually
faster than the heuristic process. Conversely, a hard trial is
determined by μU(|uA uB|)<μH(|vAvB|). In this case, the
heuristic process is faster. This distinction points to a
limitation of simple versions of dual-process thinking. For,
if one wishes to interpret the processes as more automatic
or more controlled, the same process will be more automatic
depending on whether the trial is easy or hard.
An alternative interpretation of the DPDM for the case of
preferential choice is as follows. Suppose the utility process
concentrates on the actually relevant evidence in a multi-
attribute decision problem. Hold the drift rate at a medium,
positive value. The heuristic process then reflects a
distractor attribute, which might be more or less salient. If
the distractor attribute is very salient, the drift rate of the
heuristic process is high, corresponding to the hard trials.
If the distractor corresponds to some background, less-
relevant noise, the drift rate is low. This corresponds to the
easy trials.
PREFERENTIAL CHOICE: HARD TRIALS
Consider first the case of hard trials. The following theorem
derives testable predictions for expected response times.
The result is analogous to Theorem 1 for the setting of
variable, evaluated alternatives, and the core of its proof is
an application of that result.
Theorem 3 Consider the dual-process diffusion model for
variable alternatives. For hard trials, the following holds.
(a) In case of alignment, the expected response time of a
non-preferred response is strictly longer than that of a
preferred one.
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(b) In case of conflict, the expected response time of a
preferred response is strictly longer than that of a non-
preferred one.
Proof Since μU and μH are continuous and increasing and
take the value 0 at 0, it follows that for each fixed difference
v= vAvB there exists a threshold u
*(|v|)> 0 such that
μU(|u|)<μH(|v|) for all |u|< u
*(|v|) (leading to a hard
trial) and μU(|u|)>μH(|v|) for all |u|> u
*(|v|) (leading to
an easy trial). See Figure 2 for an illustration. Formally,
u*(|v|) might be infinite, corresponding to the case where
μU(|u|)<μH(|v|) for all u. However, as long as it takes
positive values, the threshold function u*() is continuous
and strictly increasing, and it fulfills u*(0) = 0.
Consider the event that a realization of utility differences
(u, v) gives rise to a hard trial and a case of alignment.
Alignment means that u and v have the same sign. For
v> 0, a hard trial occurs for 0≤ u<u*(v) (since |v| = v).
For v<0, it occurs for u*(v)< u≤ 0 (since |v| = v). This
describes a measurable region in the (u, v)-plane. We can
analogously describe all relevant events. See Figure 3 for an
illustration.
For each realization of u and v, we obtain fixed values
μU=μU(|v|), μH=μH(|v|). The corresponding expected
response times T(Preferred|u, v) and T(Nonpref|u, v) are then
as computed in the proof of Theorem 1, substituting
“preferred” and “non-preferred” for “correct” and “error,”
respectively. Consider the case of hard trials in case of
conflict. Denote this event by HC. The expected response
times conditional on this event are given by the respective
double integrals over the area of HC.
TðPreferred HCj Þ ¼
1
Pr HCð Þ∬ u;vð Þ∈HCTðPreferred u; vj Þg uð Þh vð Þdudv
TðNonpref HCj Þ ¼
1
Pr HCð Þ∬ u;vð Þ∈HCT Nonpref u; vj Þg uð Þh vð Þdudvð
where g and h are the density functions of u and v, respectively.
For (u, v)∈HC, μU(|u|)<μH(|v|) and Theorem 1(b) applies,
hence T(Preferred|u, v)>T(Nonpref|u, v) for all (u, v)∈HC. It
follows that T(Preferred|HC)>T(Nonpref|HC), proving part
(b). The proof of part (a) is completely analogous, integrating
over the event corresponding to hard trials in case of
alignment and applying Theorem 1(a). ■
The intuition for this result is identical to that of Theorem
1. The reason is that, for the case of hard trials, the heuristic
process is always swifter. Hence, the intuition conforms to
the interpretation that this process is more automatic.
PREFERENTIAL CHOICE: EASY TRIALS
The next result considers the case of easy trials. In case of
alignment, the prediction is identical to the one in Theorem
3. In case of conflict, the prediction is the mirror image of
the one in that theorem.
Theorem 4 Consider the dual-process diffusion model for
variable alternatives. For easy trials, the following holds.
(a) In case of alignment, the expected response time of a
non-preferred response is strictly longer than that of a
preferred one.
(b) In case of conflict, the expected response time of a non-
preferred response is strictly longer than that of a
preferred one.
This last result needs no formal proof, because it can be
derived from Theorem 3 by a symmetry argument. Consider
an easy trial. The utility process is swifter than the heuristic
process. Exchanging the names of the processes, we can
consider if as a hard trial for the processes with exchanged
names, with the difference that, because of renaming, in case
of conflict what is now “preferred” was non-preferred for the
original processes. In case of alignment, the renaming of the
processes does not affect what is “preferred”. Hence, the
result follows.
The statement of Theorem 4 is that non-preferred
responses will be slower than preferred responses both in
case of alignment and in case of conflict. This prediction is
particular to the case of easy trials, that is, it obtains when
the heuristic process reflects noise due to attributes or factors
Figure 2. For a fixed value of v= vAvB, the fact that μH,μV are
increasing and continuous allows to find a cutting point u*(|v|) such
that the pair (u, v) corresponds to a hard trial for |u|< u*(|v|) and to
an easy trial if |u|> u
*
(|v|).
Figure 3. Depiction of the events combining hard or easy trials with
alignment or conflict in the space of realizations of utility differences
u and heuristic utility differences v.
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which are less relevant than the crucial ones captured by the
utility process. For instance, consider perceptual experiments
where accuracy is emphasized. In this case, non-preferred
responses are actually errors, and one could assume the
distractor heuristic to be particularly weak, so that most trials
are “easy” in the sense defined earlier. The prediction of
Theorem 4 then agrees with the general observation that in
this case errors are slower than correct responses
independently of whether there is alignment or conflict
(Luce, 1986; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998).
Without further analysis, however, the conclusion of
Theorem 4 does not necessarily mean that non-preferred
responses will be slower without conditioning on either
conflict or alignment. The unconditional expected time of
non-preferred responses is a convex combination of the
expected time of non-preferred responses in the two cases,
weighted by the probabilities of conflict and alignment
given a non-preferred response, and analogously for the
expected time of preferred responses. Because those
probabilities depend, for example, on the actual
probabilities of conflict and alignment in the paradigm at
hand, in principle the result could be overturned for the
unconditional response times. However, with two minimal
additions the model does imply the inequality for
unconditional response times. The first addition is simply
the assumption that D1≥D0, that is, conflict detection and
resolution time is larger in case of conflict (already
discussed earlier; recall Theorem 2). The second addition
is technical. Suppose that the density functions g, h of the
utility differences u, v are symmetric, that is, g(u) = g(u)
and h(v) = h(v) (which is reasonable if options are
randomized). In this case, we obtain the following
preliminary result, which is conceptually analogous to
Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Consider the DPDM for variable alternatives,
with parameters Δ, D0, and D1 with D1≥D0, and symmetric
density functions for utility differences u, v.
For easy trials, the expected response time of non-
preferred responses in case of alignment is shorter than the
expected response time of non-preferred responses in case
of conflict.
Proof For a fixed, easy trial, one obtains TH>TU and
PH<PU. A completely analogous argument to the one in
Theorem 2 establishes that, for such values, T(Nonpref|
Alignment)<T(Nonpref|Conflict). Consider a fixed (u, v)
leading to an easy trial (hence, TH(μH(|v|)>TU(μU(|u|)) and
a case of alignment. Then, (u, v) also leads to an easy trial
but a case of conflict (Figure 3). Because both (u, v) and
(u, v) lead to the same drift rates of both processes, we
obtain T(Nonpref|u, v)<T(Nonpref|u, v). Integrating this
inequality over all (u, v) leading to easy trials in case of
alignment is equivalent to integrating over all (u, v)
leading to easy trials in case of conflict (because g(u)
= g(u)). The integrals then deliver the desired result (note
that, by symmetry of g and h, the total probability mass
of the easy alignment and the easy conflict areas is
identical). ■
This lemma can then be used to show that, in the case of
easy trials, non-preferred responses will also be slower than
preferred ones without conditioning on alignment or conflict.
Corollary 2. Consider the DPDM for variable alternatives
and easy trials, with parameters Δ, D0, and D1 with
D1≥D0, and symmetric density functions for utility
differences u, v. The unconditional expected response time
of non-preferred responses is strictly longer than the
unconditional expected response time of preferred ones.
Proof All quantities below are conditional on easy trials; I
skip this conditioning to ease notation. Let p=Pr(Conflict|
Nonpref) and q=Pr(Conflict|Preferred). It will be shown that
p> q, that is, it is more likely to be in a situation of conflict if
a non-preferred response is observed than if a preferred one
is observed. To see this, note that for fixed values of u, v,
setting PH=PH(μH(|v|)) and PU=PU(μU(|u|)),
PrðNonpref Conflict; u; vj Þ ¼
ΔPH þ 1 Δð Þ 1 PUð Þ > Δ 1 PHð Þ þ 1 Δð Þ 1 PUð Þ
¼ Pr Nonpref Alignment;u; vj Þð
simply because PH > 12. As in the proof of the last lemma,
note that (u, v) results in an easy trial and a case of conflict
if and only if (u, v) results in an easy trial and a case of
alignment. Integrating over all values of (u, v) yielding a
conflict in easy trials (and using symmetry of g and h; recall
Figure 3) shows that Pr(Nonpref|Conflict)>Pr(Nonpref|
Alignment). Analogously, we obtain that Pr(Preferred|
Conflict)<Pr(Preferred|Alignment).
From the first inequality and the equation
Pr Nonprefð Þ ¼ PrðNonpref Conflictj ÞPr Conflictð Þ











PrðNonpref Conflictj ÞPr Conflictð Þ
Pr Nonprefð Þ
>
PrðPreferred Conflictj ÞPr Conflictð Þ
Pr Preferredð Þ
¼ q
establishing that p> q.
Let TNA, TNC, TPA, and TPC be the expected response time
of non-preferred responses conditional on alignment, of non-
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preferred responses conditional on conflict, of preferred
responses conditional on alignment, and of preferred
responses conditional on conflict, respectively. By Theorem
4, we have that TNA>TPA and TNC>TPC. By Lemma 2,
we have that TNC>TNA. Let T(Nonpref) and T(Preferred)
denote the expected response times of non-preferred and
preferred responses in easy trials, respectively.
T Nonprefð Þ ¼ pTNC þ 1 pð ÞTNA ¼ TNA þ p TNC  TNAð Þ >
TNA þ q TNC  TNAð Þ ¼ qTNC þ 1 qð ÞTNA >
qTPC þ 1 qð ÞTPA ¼ T Preferredð Þ
where the first inequality follows from TNCTNA>0 and
p> q, and the second inequality follows from TNA>TPA
and TNC>TPC. This completes the proof. ■
A CONSUMER CHOICE EXAMPLE
As an example of application, I analyzed data from a recent
study on brand recognition and product ratings by Thoma
and Williams (2013). Participants were presented with a
variety of choices among consumer items (see Thoma &
Williams, 2013, for details). Crucially for our purposes, the
items varied in two attributes. The first was the brand of
the product. Stimuli were labeled with famous and unknown
brands, and hence, brand heuristic would lead to the selection
of the famous brand. However, the second stimuli was a
consumer rating in the form of a certain number of stars.
Stimulus pairs created three within conditions, according to
whether the product from a famous brand was labeled with
more, less, or the same stars as the product from a nonfamous
brand. In the terms of the previous sections, the first and the
second classes correspond to alignment and conflict,
respectively.
Thoma and Williams (2013) recorded response times for
all choices, but used them for a different purpose. I
reanalyzed their data in order to test the model. The steps
of the analysis were as follows. First, Thoma and Williams
(2013) checked whether the famous brands were actually
recognized by the participants and reported this in their data.
I hence concentrated on the trials in which there was actual
recognition. Second, response times above 10 seconds were
excluded (the grand average of response times in the study
was 2.86 seconds, with a standard deviation of 3.00 seconds;
some response times were above 30 seconds, one around
85 seconds). Then, individual average response times were
computed conditional on conflict and alignment (those were
taken to be the unit of analysis because the predictions
derived from the DPDM in this work refer to expected
conditional response times), and conditional on the actual
response, that is, whether the product from the famous brand
was chosen or not. For each test below, only participants
who made at least two choices of each type were
considered.
In terms of the DPDM, this example fits the case of
preferential choice, because the actual choices varied among
very different products from trial to trial. Brand recognition
is the natural candidate for the heuristic process in the model,
and the utility process can be taken to be based on the
number of stars observed. This kind of recognition is often
assumed to be rather quick and the experiment always used
famous versus nonfamous brands; thus, the difference in
heuristic utilities should be large. Hence, it is reasonable to
assume that, in the terminology of the model for preferential
choice, the experiment generated hard trials. Hence, the
predictions are derived from Theorem 3, taking “preferred”
to mean the product with a larger number of stars.
Consider the case of conflict, that is, trials where the
product from the famous brand was given less stars than
the alternative product. The prediction from Theorem 3(b)
is that preferred responses should be slower than non-
preferred ones. In this case, choosing the famous product is
“non-preferred.” The mean of the individual average
response times when choosing non-famous (preferred)
products was 2.81 seconds, against 2.53 seconds when
choosing famous (non-preferred) products. The difference
in distributions was significant according to a Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank test (N=26, z=1.968, p=.049).
The case of alignment corresponds to trials where the
product from the famous brand was given more stars than
the alternative product, and the “preferred” response was to
choose the famous product. The prediction from Theorem 3(a)
is that non-preferred responses should be slower than preferred
ones. The mean of the individual average response times when
choosing famous (preferred) products was 2.51 seconds, against
3.00 seconds when choosing non-famous (non-preferred)
products. The difference in distributions was weakly significant
according to a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test (N=26, z= 1.892,
p=.059).
Remark 2 Brand recognition can be considered as a particular
case of the recognition heuristic (e.g., Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 2011; Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). The recognition
heuristic has been used as a case study for sophisticated
cognitive architectures as ACT-R (Marewski & Mehlhorn,
2011). I use the study of Thoma and Williams (2013) here
merely as an example of multi-attribute choice. In this sense,
the processes assumed by the DPDM in this example remain
“black boxes” whose favored response can be readily
identified. In this and many other cases, the DPDM has to
be understood as an “as if” model.
DISCUSSION
The first subsection below compares the DPDM to other
available models from the literature. The second subsection
discusses the limitations of the model and points out possible
extensions.
Comparison with other models
Decision field theory
The model presented here is conceptually related to Decision
Field Theory, or DFT for short (see Busemeyer & Diederich,
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2002, for a review). As presented in Busemeyer and
Townsend (1993), DFT is a stochastic dynamic model of
choice behavior, which was originally developed for binary
choices. Diederich (1997) extended the theory to multi-
attribute decision making, and this latter extension bears
several conceptual similarities with the model presented here.
DFT assumes that decision makers update “strength of pre-
ference” values in time by adding valence inputs. When those
valences come from several dimensions (multi-attribute setting),
the update is based on weighted evaluations. As in weighted
additive utility models, the weights represent the relative
importance or attention of the attributes. However, the weights
themselves change over time according to a stationary stochastic
process W(t) (a Markov process in Diederich, 1997). In the
optional stopping time version of DFT, a response is generated
when one of the preference strengths reaches a given threshold.
Consider a two-attribute, binary choice model. Each of the
attributes, which provide input for the dynamic updating of
preference strengths, could be considered to be analogous
to a decision process. The ideas in the model presented here
can be recast by assuming the two attributes to represent a
heuristic evaluation and a relevant normative one, res-
pectively. A situation of conflict is one where the two
attributes point toward different options.
In DFT, however, preference strengths are updated for
each option, and the attributes combine and influence both
at every point in time. If the DPDM is reinterpreted in terms
of DFT, what is updated are preference strength differences,
one for each attribute (process). That is, while in DFT
multiple attributes are constantly combined in order to
generate weighted preferences for certain, given weights W(t),
in the DPDM the attributes are never combined into a
signal measure. Rather, preference, although constantly
changing in time, remains multidimensional, and the
parameter Δ determines which dimension will eventually
dominate.
The differences are best seen if one considers the
continuous-time limit of the DFT, which is actually a
diffusion process (see, e.g., Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002,
for details). By construction, the total change in preference
strength in DFT is zero, that is, whatever preference strength
an option gains, another option loses. This means that the
model reduces to a single diffusion process, with within-trial
changes in the drift rate. In contrast, the DPDM operates with
two independent diffusion processes with constant but
different drifts. This raises an interesting possibility: for the
case of binary choice, one could formulate a DPDM where
one of the diffusion processes captures a DFT model, while
the other remains a conceptually simple automatic process.
The result would be a model where deliberative aspects of
thinking follow DFT, but are perturbed by a more heuristic
process.
Linear ballistic accumulation
The linear ballistic accumulation (LBA) model arose as a
simplification of the leaky competing accumulator model of
Usher and McClelland (2001). In that model, each possible
option is associated to an accumulator that changes in time,
gathering evidence for the option while past evidence decays.
As in DFT, an option is chosen when one of the accumulators
reaches a given threshold. In Usher and McClelland (2001),
the rates of evidence accumulation (drift rates) were allowed
to fluctuate across trials. Brown and Heathcote (2005) sim-
plified the model by dropping the within-trial randomness,
and Brown and Heathcote (2008) further assumed linear
evidence accumulation. The resulting model is the LBA,
which has the advantage of being analytically solvable and
has been shown to capture many of the empirical regularities
reflected in the leaky competing accumulator model.
The key characteristic that the LBA model shares with the
DPDM is that both assume separate evidence accumulation
processes with constant drift rates, rather than relying on
weighted preferences with within-trial variability in drift.
The key difference is that, as DFT, the LBA model considers
evidence accumulation for each option, with the threshold
parameter representing the finish line of a race, while the
DPDM considers evidence accumulation for each attribute,
with the process selection parameter determining the
probability with which each process will ultimately be
decisive.
However, the LBA model has two additional sources of
randomness in comparison to the DPDM. First, the drift rates,
while fixed, are initially drawn from normal distributions with
given, different means for the different options. That is, the
parameters for fixed alternatives are the means of the dis-
tributions of drift rates, while in the DPDM the parameters
are directly the drift rates. Second, the starting points for
evidence accumulators in the LBA are also random values,
drawn from a uniform distribution on an interval. As the
DPDM, the LBA can be used to predict relative speeds of
correct and incorrect response times, but it does so relying on
the interplay between start point variability and drift rate
variability (Brown & Heathcote, 2008, p. 160), while the
DPDM does not rely on either of them.
A nice illustration of the LBA was provided by Eidels
(2012), who showed that the model can predict the Stroop
effect by relying on four independent channels (presented
word, presented color, non-presented word, and non-
presented color) and 10 parameters. The point of Eidels
(2012) was to show (numerically) that the Stroop effect can
be encompassed in a stochastic model not involving a
cross-talk between the channels for word and color. The
DPDM achieves the same effect (as an analytical result;
recall Theorem 2) with two processes, one reflecting word
recognition and another reflecting color recognition.
Stroop counter model
Trainham, Lindsay, and Jacoby (1997) postulate two processes
corresponding to word and color recognition, respectively. The
model evolves in finite discrete intervals. In each one, a piece
of evidence is received and each process has a given
probability, W(t) and C(t), of allocating the count to the target
response counter (parameterized as a gamma density function
and a cumulative gamma function, respectively). In case both
processes receive the chance to allocate the count, the word
recognition process dominates. This model shares with the
DPDM the idea of modeling word and color recognition as
different processes, which are viewed as alternative (no
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evidence is aggregated). However, the model is very different.
First, the processes’ “dominant responses” are deterministic,
that is, the word recognition process either allocates the count
to the named color or delivers no evidence. In the DPDM, each
process can potentially deliver each of the two possible
responses. Second, although processes are viewed as alternatives,
this occurs at the count level, while in the DPDM this occurs at
the aggregate level (Δ determines which process determines the
final answer).
The dual-stage two-phase model
The dual-stage two-phase model of Hübner, Steinhauser, and
Lehle (2010) targets conflict situations, especially in the
flanker task. It incorporates two discrete, sequential stages
(Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). The first one is a race
model where two diffusion processes run in parallel. One
process is for response selection and is called early selection
process; the other is for target selection and is called late
selection process. If the early selection process finishes first,
it determines the decision and the trial ends. If the late
selection process wins the race, the model enters the second
stage, where the decision-selection process continues in
isolation with a new, different drift rate (positive or negative
depending on target selection). This represents the idea that
the target of attention (central stimulus or flanker) has been
selected and there is no further interference.
The DSTP of Hübner et al. (2010) is quite different from
the DPDM, because its main emphasis is on the two discrete
stages (hence “dual-stage” and not “dual-process”). Still, it
has to be credited as the first to explicitly incorporate the
basic dual-process idea of different processes in a
diffusion-process setting. Hübner et al. (2010) provided
evidence that the DSTP delivers a better data fit than a
single-process model in the flanker task, but White et al.
(2011) found that a single-process with inter-trial variation
of the drift rate (which resembles the results of the DPDM)
fares better.
Dual-response Bayesian sequential risk-taking
Pleskac and Wershbale (2014) have recently developed a
model to explain data from the Balloon-Analogue Risk Task
(BART), where participants sequentially pump a balloon
trying to inflate it as much as possible but stopping before
it explodes. The model is an explicit dual-process model
which shares a crucial feature with the DPDM. At each pump
opportunity, there is an explicit probability that the decision
to pump or not will be made by a slow, deliberative process.
As in the DPDM, the deliberative process is modeled as a
diffusion process that gradually gathers evidence in order to
decide whether to pump or to stop. With the remaining
probability, an automatic process takes over. In contrast to
the DPDM, this automatic process is assumed to simply
pump, that is, it has zero response variability. Because the
automatic process is not explicitly modeled, Pleskac and
Wershbale (2014) directly assume an ex-Gaussian
distribution for the response times arising from this process.
This difference is crucial. Mathematically, for each isolated
decision, the model of Pleskac and Wershbale (2014) could
be considered as a limit case of the DPDM where the drift
rate of the heuristic process is taken to infinity, hence
obtaining a zero fault probability. However, this would also
imply a response time of zero for that process.
Pleskac and Wershbale (2014) defend the dual-process
approach showing that the addition of a probability that an
automatic process makes the decision considerably improves
the fit to experimental data from the BART. Their approach
hence shares a basic motivation with the DPDM. Further,
the basic building block that a decision is made by either
one or another process is common to both models. However,
the model of Pleskac and Wershbale (2014) is tailored to the
BART as an example of sequential decisions. This difference
is crucial and makes a direct comparison impossible. The
DPDM is designed to model a static decision problem,
corresponding to experiments with either isolated or repeated
decisions with no intertemporal structure, for example, a
series of analogous decisions. In the BART, decisions are
part of a sequence with explicit interdependences. The first
decision to stop, or the first negative feedback, end the
sequence, while each decision to pump opens the door to a
further decision. As a consequence, in the model of Pleskac
and Wershbale (2014) both the deliberative process’ drift
parameter and the probability that the automatic process
makes the decision are assumed to depend on the trial
number, reflecting learning as the number of pumps increases
(making a decision after n pumps implies there have been n
successful pumps). In contrast to the DPDM, the model is
designed to fit response time evidence as a function of pump
number.
A default-interventionist model
Klauer and Voss (2008) discussed several models in the
context of a weapon identification task where race is primed
before a stimuli (gun or tool) is shown and has to be
identified. The task is difficult to compare with the ones
discussed here because of the sequential presentation of the
stimuli and its reliance on priming. However, several of the
models considered are of interest beyond the particular task.
One such model is a “default-interventionist” dual-process
model which bears a certain similarity to a simplified version
of the DPDM (Klauer & Voss, 2008, Figure 4). An automatic
bias cues a default response, which is driven by the race
prime but can be any of the two options with certain
probabilities. With a fixed probability, the automatic process
simply determines the response on the basis of the default.
With the remaining probability, an intervention occurs and
the controlled process delivers the correct response with
certainty (tool or gun). That is, the controlled process has
zero response variability. Response times are simply
assumed to be fast for the automatic process and slow for
the controlled process. Hence, errors arise only from the
automatic process and are always fast, while correct
responses are a mixture of fast and slow decisions. This
simple model gives a stylized explanation for faster errors
in dual-process terms, but cannot explain asymmetries as that
predicted by the DPDM (recall Theorem 1). Interestingly,
however, if the model was enriched to allow for response
variability for the controlled process, the result would be a
version of the DPDM where processes are simple biased
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coin tosses instead of diffusion processes. Still, to re-
produce the predictions of the DPDM one would need to
specify fault probabilities fulfilling the properties identified
in Corollary 1; this was exactly the approach taken in
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014).
Outlook and future extensions
This work has proposed a parsimonious two-process model
building on the simplest version of the well-known diffusion
model. The model fits available empirical evidence on
response times and is analytically tractable, in the sense that
testable predictions can be derived without the recourse to
numerical examples. It can be taken as a structuring
framework for the study of response times in decision
making, which can be put to the test in the laboratory and
potentially expanded in a number of interesting directions.
The predictions translate into simple tests for response
times conditional on correct and erroneous responses. As
long as an experimental paradigm generates enough data,
the ideal tests are within participants (paired samples), for
they abstract from individual parameter variability. The
paradigm, however, needs to identify which responses are
correct and which are errors, or alternatively to clearly
identify the favored responses of the two candidate processes
(recall the consumer-choice example above). For inference
models as those often used in judgment and decision making,
this is rarely a problem, as there exist normatively correct
answers. For preferential choice, special care should be taken
to ensure that this is possible. For instance, studies in risky
choice using classical paradigms might not be well suited
for this purpose, because preference elicitation itself is
known to be subject to a number of biases and be generally
noisy (Butler & Loomes, 2007; Schmidt & Hey, 2004) (see
Alós-Ferrer, Granić, Kern, & Wagner, 2016 for a model of
response times in such settings). Further, the fact that choice
might influence preferences within an experiment (Ariely &
Norton, 2008; Brehm, 1956) presents a particular challenge
for experimental design. Developing improved paradigms
delivering appropriate data represents an interesting avenue
of research. For instance, in the domain of risky choice this
could be accomplished by estimating the preferences (e.g.,
a risk aversion parameter) in a separate set of lotteries before
considering the actual choices affected by a particular
heuristic process.
The model has of course a number of limitations, some of
which could be addressed with extensions in a number of
natural directions. First, the model targets only binary
decisions at this point, and an extension to multiple
alternatives would require an approach not unlike the
assumption of binariness in decision theory. In contrast, an
extension to more than two processes is straightforward,
since the modeling unit is the process and not the alternative.
Second, it does not account for speed-accuracy tradeoffs
(Heitz, 2014), where time pressure results in an increase in
error rates. For a single diffusion process, speed-accuracy
tradeoffs can be modeled through the assumption that time
pressure reduces the barrier (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). The
building block of the DPDM are diffusion processes with
symmetric and identical barriers. Hence, it would be possible
to incorporate a similar assumption in the DPDM, for
example, by assuming that only the barrier of the utility
process is affected (recall, however, Remark 1). Third,
dual-process theories assume that experimental mani-
pulations as cognitive load or even time pressure can shift
the balance among processes. This point has not been
addressed in the current version of the DPDM, because the
exogenous parameter Δ has been left unspecified. This is
reasonable for the objectives of the work at hand, because
the exact value of Δ does not affect the predictions of the
formal results presented here. However, it would be natural
to assume that, for example, cognitive load increases Δ,
resulting in a larger share of decisions accruing to the
heuristic process. This could also provide a different channel
for modeling speed–accuracy trade-offs.
In the context of the preferential choice model, it is also
natural to speculate that the probability with which a process
is selected might depend, for example, on whether a trial is
hard or easy. More generally, extensions of the DPDM might
fully endogenize the value of Δ in such a way that its value
would be naturally linked to the kind of trial. A first
possibility would be to consider a race among the two
diffusion processes, analogous to race models among
accumulators (LaBerge, 1962; Usher & McClelland, 2001;
Vickers, 1970). However, such an extended model would
have the unappealing property that most of the time the
swifter process would win the race. An alternative to race
models would be to endogenize process selection through a
two-phase approach as in Hübner et al. (2010).
A further, practical limitation of the preferential choice
model is that it implicitly assumes that in actual applications
it will be easy to distinguish whether hard or easy trials are
involved. This is of course a matter of proper experimental
design, but still some paradigms might actually generate both,
and, unless those can be distinguished, sharper assumptions
will be needed to obtain unconditional predictions.
It should be remarked that, at this point, the DPDM is
conceived as a simple, parsimonious formal-analytical
framework delivering easily testable predictions of an
ordinal nature (which response times are larger) at the
population level. In particular, this work has abstracted from
possible fitting to data at the individual level in order to
estimate the actual parameters. The setting, however, is
based on the diffusion model, for which such approaches
have been enormously fruitful, and hence, given appropriate
data, it would in principle be possible to perform such
estimations.
To conclude, the DPDM is a formal, stylized model using
single-strategy building blocks within a multi-strategy (dual-
process) setting, which delivers predictions on response
times without imposing sharp conditions on parameter
values. Future research should build upon the basic structure
of the model to exploit the advantages of both the multi-
strategy approach and the single-strategy components. In this
sense, the present article contributes to the literature on
strategy selection by demonstrating how simple formal
models can help build bridges between single-strategy and
multi-strategy models.
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